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Abstract
In recent years, the increasing awarding of patents has cap-
tured the attention of scholars operating in different fields. Eco-
nomic literature has studied the causes of this proliferation; we
propose an entry game focusing on one of the consequences, show-
ing how an incumbent may create a patent portfolio in order to
control market entry and to collude. The incumbent fixes the
level of patent protection and the threat of denunciation reduces
the entrant’s expected profits; moreover, if the entrant deviates
from collusion, the incumbent can strengthen punishment suing
the competitor for patent infringement, reducing her incentive to
deviate. Our analysis suggests that antitrust authorities should
pay attention to the level of patent protection implemented by
the incumbent and note whether the holder of a patent reacts to
entry by either suing or not suing the competitor. In the model,
we use completely general functional forms in analyzing the is-
sues, and this allows us to obtain general results not depending
on the assumptions about the kind of oligopolistic competition.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the huge proliferation in patenting has captured the
attention of scholars operating in different fields: for example, Boldrin
and Levine (2013) note that ’In 1983 in the United States, 59,715 patents
were issued; by 2003, 189,597 patents were issued; and in 2010, 244,341
new patents were approved. In less than 30 years, the flow of patents
more than quadrupled’. It is interesting to note that patents have grown
more than R&D spending,1 increasing the patent intensity, i.e. the ratio
between number of patens and R&D expenditure, and that firms in most
industries do not rely on patents to profit from R&D investments.2
Such increase in the number of patents has caused an explosion of
patent litigation in many industries: the Price Waterhouse Cooper 2014
Litigation Study,3 based on US Patent and Trademark Office Data, re-
ports an annual 8% growth in patent actions fieled from 1991 through
2013.4 However, the growth in the number of litigations is lower than
the growth in the number of patents: Lemley (2001) estimates that only
0.1 percent of all patents are litigated to trial. Moreover, Kesan and Ball
(2010) state that patent litigation is a settlement mechanism: about 10
percent of patent cases filed in 2000 led to rulings and verdicts; more
recently, Allison et al. (2014) present a study of patent litigation filed in
US Federal Courts in 2008 and 2009 (roughly 5000 lawsuits): it emerges
that less than 20% arrives to a verdict. In other words, with respect to
the huge number of patents granted every year, few are litigated, even
less arrive to a verdict.
These evidences (patent paradox, relative few litigations and ver-
dicts) may undermine the idea that firms patent to protect innovation,
and suggest that patents have a different role in the strategy of the firm.
Economic literature has given some explanations concerning such a role:
one is that patents serve as a quality signal for markets and investors;5
1See Blind et al. (2006).
2This is the so called patent paradox. See Hall and Ziedonis (2001), Shrestha
(2010) and Pe´nin (2012).
3Available on line at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-
services/publications/patent-litigation-study.html
4Probably, some of the most famous of these lawsuits are the ones between Ap-
ple Inc. and Samsung Corp. in the so-called smartphone patent war, but there
were similar cases in many other industries: in 1999, a patent for one-click ordering
technology led to a patent war between Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble; in 2004,
Sony and Kodak engaged in a patent war over digital cameras; in 2009, Stretchline
sued H&M for infringing bra patent; in recent years, the agricultural giant Mon-
santo sued hundreds of small farmers in the United States in attempt to protect its
patent rights on genetically engineered seeds; in 2014, Bose sued Beats over patents
on noise-canceling headphones etc.
5See, inter alia, Long (2002), Gambardella (2013), Comino and Graziano (2015).
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another is that firms may build a patent portfolio as a defensive tool in
a lawsuit for patent infringement;6 some literature has analyzed abuses
of single dominant position by the owner of a patent portfolio finalized
to maintain a monopolistic position.7
In our analysis we do not neglect these reasons, but we look at
the problem from an ex-post perspective, considering a consequence of
patent granting: we present a model where creating a patent portfolio
can be finalized to control market entry and to collude. To the best of
our knowledge, there is no literature on the relation between building a
patent portfolio and colluding.8
We propose an entry game where an incumbent protects her market
with patents. However, patents do not grant per se a monopoly, since
they may be invalidated by a court;9 hence, another firm may enter the
market and compete. As in Yiannaka and Fulton (2011), the key idea
presented in our paper is that the value of a patent lies in the option
that it creates to litigate.10 We show that patents facilitate collusion,
because the threat of denunciation reduces the entrant expected profits,
and, if the entrant deviates from collusion, the incumbent can strengthen
punishment suing her for patent right infringement. The consequence
is that the incumbent may use her patent portfolio in order to relax
competition in the market making collusion easier to sustain. The main
result of the paper is that the incumbent might find it optimal to collude
with the entrant when the lawsuit cost is low enough and the cost for
implementing patent protection is high enough.
In addition, note that, since we use completely general functional
forms in analyzing the issues, our results are very general and not affected
by arbitrary assumptions about the kind of oligopolistic competition, or
the level of product differentiation.
A relevant policy implication of our analysis is that enforcing patent
6See Hall and Ziedonis (2001), Ziedonis (2004), Choi and Gerlach (2017).
7Analysis of deterrence to entry through the refuse of licensing or the threat of sue
for patents infringement are in Lerner and Tirole (2004), Robledo (2005), Agarwal
et al. (2009), Gavin and Toh (2010). See Somaya (2012) for a survey of the literature
on the strategic use of patents.
8A branch of the literature analyzes how, in an entry game, a firm that obtained
a patent may find it optimal not to sue the entrant: see, for example, Choi (1998),
Aoki and Hu (1999), Yiannaka and Fulton (2006).
9Patent protection is always stochastic and in some cases may be weak : on the
notion of probabilistic patents see Lemley and Shapiro (2005); on the notion of weak
patents see Farrell and Shapiro (2008).
10However, they present an entry game focused on the effect that potential liti-
gation has on the quality differentiation between goods while we consider a general
framework, underlining how this option modifies the trigger strategy of the incum-
bent.
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protection can be part of a pro-collusive strategy by firms with significant
market power abusing their dominant position, in violation of Article 102
of the Treaty of Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Under the
US antitrust law, we have a facilitating practice, patenting without
invoking a trial to defend the market from entry, that sustains a price-
fixing scheme; the latter is a per se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we briefly recall
the framework we use to analyze collusion sustainability; in Section 3
we present the model and analyze the subgame perfect Nash equilibria
(SPNE) of the game, focusing on the case where collusion emerges as an
equilibrium; policy implications and conclusions are discussed in Section
4.
2 Tacit collusion in oligopoly
Tacit collusion is a strategic conduct that enables firms to obtain supra-
normal profits, where normal profits correspond to the ones achieved
in the one shot game equilibrium. The analysis of collusion is based
on the so called incentive compatible constraint for collusion: collusion
is sustainable if there are not incentives to defect, which requires the
expected benefits from collusion to be higher than the expected benefits
from deviation.
In general, collusion is more likely to arise when deviating firm would
obtain small gains from deviation, when punishment does affect her pay-
off and when each firm attaches high weight to future profits. The latter
depends on the value of the firm’s discount factor of the future profits
(usually indicated for firm i with the symbol δi).
Following Friedman (1971), let N , C and D be respectively the one-
shot payoffs in the Nash equilibrium, in case of collusion and in case of
deviation from collusion, where D > C > N. Considering supergames,
i.e. infinitely repeated one-shot games, according to the given trigger
strategy,11 in order to sustain collusion the following incentive compati-
ble constraint must be satisfied.
C
1− δi ≥ D +
δiN
1− δi (1)
That is
11A grim trigger strategy is any of a class of strategies in which a player begins by
cooperating in the first period, and continues to cooperate until a single defection by
the opponent is observed. If defection occurs the player using grim trigger will play
Nash reversion for the remainder of the iterated game. This strategy is applied to
infinitely repeated games.
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δi ≥ σ∗ = D − C
D −N (2)
where δi is the individual discount factor of firm i, measuring the
weight of future profits, and σ∗ is the critical discount factor. Constraint
(1) compares expected profits by collusion with the ones by deviation
in an infinite-horizon setting. According to (2), only if each firm is
sufficiently patient, i.e. ∀i, δi ≥ σ∗, tacit collusion is part of a SPNE of
the considered game.
The higher the value of σ∗, the more difficult the sustainability of
collusion.12 This argument can be applied to every kind of oligopolistic
market.13
3 The model
3.1 Model setting
We consider a market where initially only one firm, the incumbent I,
operates protecting her monopoly with a patent portfolio. The incum-
bent enforces the wished level of patent protection registering the chosen
number of patents; in particular, we assume: stochastic patent protec-
tion;14 positive correlation between probability of succeeding in patent
litigation and size of patent portfolio; not negligible cost for implement-
ing patent protection. In other words, in order to enforce a probability
of succeeding in a patent litigation equal to β ∈ [0, 1], the incumbent
bears a cost x (β) > 0. The cost function x (β) is increasing and convex
with respect to β, and such that the incumbent earns negative expected
profits by enforcing a probability of success β = 1. This assumption
avoids deterministic (or complete) patent protection.15
When a competitor E enters the market, the incumbent can sue the
entrant for patent right infringement; at the same time, the entrant
may ask the court to invalidate the patent.16 In case of lawsuit, the
incumbent and the entrant sustain an additional cost L > 0 regardless
12For example, it is easy to show that, in a duopoly with linear demand and
constant marginal costs, collusion is easier to sustain under price competition (σ∗ =
0.5) than under quantity competition (σ∗ ≃ 0.53).
13It is easy to check the robustness of our results assuming different punishment
mechanisms, such as optimal penal code, that impact only the value of the critical
discount factor.
14See Lemley and Shapiro (2005).
15We assume that x(0) = 0, x′ > 0, x′′ > 0 and x(1) >> M1−δI , where M and δI
respectively denote the one-shot monopolistic profit and the incumbent’s discount
factor.
16Note that, independently from the firm starting the trial, the probability to have
a judgement in favor of the incumbent (entrant) is always β (1− β).
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the outcome of the process. In order to avoid the trivial case where
too high lawsuit costs disincentivize firms to litigate, we restrict our
attention to values of L low enough. Moreover, we assume that, under
a legal patent protection system, none can be tried two times for the
same violation. In order to stress the strategic role of patenting in the
entry game, we assume the existence of only one potential entrant and
rule out the possibility of licensing.
If the incumbent wins the trial, a fine F > 0 is charged to the entrant
and transferred to the incumbent; the entrant goes out from the market.
Conversely, if the decision is in favor of the entrant, no fine is charged
and firms compete in a duopolistic market.
The game is specified as follows:
- At the pre-entry stage t=0, the incumbent chooses the number of
patents to protect the market: this implements an endogenous probabil-
ity β of success in a lawsuit for patent right infringement.
- At stage t=1, the entrant observes β and decides whether to enter
the market and compete with the incumbent.17
- At stage t=2 (with the entry of a competitor), both firms can
start a lawsuit: the incumbent may sue the entrant for patent right
infringement; the entrant may ask the court to invalidate the patents.
- At stage t=3, if any firm had sued the competitor, a court (nature)
decides the lawsuit outcome. If the judgment is in favour of the incum-
bent (with probability β), the entrant pays a fine F to the incumbent,
and exits the market; otherwise (with probability 1− β), the two firms
stay in the market.
- At stage t=4, firms start market competition according to the out-
comes of previous stages. This stage is infinitely repeated.
Figure 1 describes the timing of the game.
In the production stage (t=4), we observe monopoly either if at t=1
entry does not occur, or if at t=3 the court’s judgement is in favor of the
incumbent; we observe duopoly either if at t=2 none have started the
lawsuit, or if at t=3 the court’s judgement is in favor of the entrant.18
17If β = 0, the competitor always enters the market and collusion is sustainable if
firms are sufficiently patient.
18Note that collusion may emerge in equilibrium only when entry occurs and none
sues the competitor: firms cannot collude after the court decides in favor of the
entrant. This is not an assumption, but an implicit result of our model setting: at
this stage of the game lawsuit and patent registration are sunk costs, hence the one-
period profits and the critical discount factors needed to collude are unaffected by
the court decision; then, if collusion is not sustainable at the beginning of the game,
it will not be even at this stage. In other words, firms patient enough to collude
at t=4, can collude at t=0 as well, without incurring in patents and lawsuits costs:
colluding at t=0 strictly dominates colluding at t=4.
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Figure 1: The timing of the game
In all stages, firms play non-cooperatively and simultaneously. More-
over we assume symmetry in the firm’s one-shot profits by collusion,
deviation and Nash competition (i.e. CE = CI = C, DE = DI = D and
NE = NI = N, where D > C > N ≥ 0), asymmetry in the firms’ dis-
count factors (i.e. δE R δI ), and discounted profits from the repetition
of the production stage.19 We use backward induction to find the SPNE
of the game.
Setting the level of patent protection (β) is the core of the incum-
bent’s strategies: she can choose either a non-cooperative strategy (nc),
an aggressive strategy of full deterrence (fd), or an accommodating strat-
egy of collusion (ac). In case of non-cooperative strategy, the incumbent
maximizes her non-collusive expected profits aware of the potential en-
19Despite the finite duration of patent protection, our model assumes an infinite
horizon. What may seem like an unrealistic hypothesis does not invalidate the insight
of our analysis. As explained by Tirole (1988), ’the infinite horizon assumption needs
not to be taken too seriously’ (p. 253). Even if patent protection is limited to a finite
number of periods we may assume that at each period there is a probability that the
market does not survive (for example that an innovative good is produced), hence
the game ’ends in finite time but everything is as if the horizon is infinite’. The σ
represents the firm expectation on the market length.
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try of a new competitor; in case of full deterrence, she implements the
level of patent protection that makes entrant’s expected profit non pos-
itive; in case of collusion, she accommodates the entry not suing the
entrant and setting the collusive outcome. At the same time the entrant
can either enter the market asking the court to invalidate the patents
or competing without sueing the incumbent; in this case collusion may
emerge as equilibrium of the game.
We now discuss the incumbent’s strategies and the equilibria in the
subgames.
3.2 Non-collusive entry (nc)
We start considering the non-collusive subgame. We assume that, bear-
ing a cost x(β), the incumbent sets a β such that her expected profit is
maximized.
If β > 0, when entry occurs both firms can start a lawsuit, paying
a cost L > 0. In case of patent infringement (with probability β), the
entrant pays a fine F > 0 and exits the market, while the incumbent
remains monopolist. Otherwise (with probability 1 − β), the two firms
play a one-shot Nash equilibrium at any production stage. Firms dis-
count profit at δi with i = E, I. Hence, the firms’ expected profits,
independently from the firm starting the trial, are the following:
ΠncE = β(−F ) + (1− β)
(
N
1− δE
)
− L (3)
ΠncI = β
(
M
1− δI + F
)
+ (1− β)
(
N
1− δI
)
− x(β)− L (4)
where:
E and I denote the entrant and the incumbent;
ΠE and ΠI are the entrant’s and the incumbent’s expected profits;
nc is the index denoting the non-cooperative case;
β ∈ [0, 1] is the incumbent’s probability of success in lawsuit (i.e. the
level of enforced patent protection);
x(β) is the cost of implementing a level of patent protection equal to β;
L is the fixed cost of standing trial;
F is the fine charged to the entrant and transferred to the incumbent
when the court finds an infringement;
M is the one-shot monopoly profit;
N is the per-firm one-shot Nash profit in duopoly;
δE and δI are respectively the entrant’s and the incumbent’s discount
factors.
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In order to have a framework as general as possible, we assume that:
M > N ≥ 0, δE ∈ [0, 1), δI ∈ [0, 1), all the relevant parameters are
common knowledge and the firms’ discount factors are observable.
In this case, the incumbent sets β equal to the level βnc such that
her expected profit is maximized, that is:
βnc = argMaxΠncI (β)
Maximizing with respect to β the profit expressed by condition (4),
we have:
M −N
1− δI + F = x
′(βnc)
Notice that, βnc is unaffected by the cost of standing trial L and
decreasing with respect to the cost of implementing patent protection,
x(β) (which is assumed increasing in β).
3.3 Full deterrence (fd)
In case of full deterrence, the incumbent sets a β such that the entrant’s
expected profit, described in equation (3), is equal to zero: the competi-
tor does not enter the market and the incumbent keeps her monopoly.
When we exclude any patent protection (i.e. β = 0) entry always
occurs, since the entrant’s expected profit ΠncE (β = 0) is strictly positive.
However, there exists a threshold value of the level of patent pro-
tection βfd ∈ [0, 1] implemented by the incumbent, such that for higher
values of β entry is not profitable without collusion. If we set the en-
trant’s expected profit computed in equation (3) to zero, we obtain:
βfd =
N − L(1− δE)
N + F (1− δE) (5)
Hence, if β ≥ βfd, the incumbent deters entry obtaining the following
profit:20
ΠfdI = Π
nc
I
(
βfd
)
=
M
1− δI − x
(
βfd
)
(6)
Notice that, βfd is unaffected by the cost of implementing patent
protection x(β) and decreasing with respect to the cost of standing trial
L.21
20This conduct may represent a strategic barrier to entry.
21If βnc ≥ βfd, the full deterrence strategy dominates the non-collusive one and
the incumbent sets β = βfd.
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3.4 Accommodation and collusion (ac)
In the accommodating subgame, the incumbent sets a β such that col-
lusion is sustainable. When collusion emerges in equilibrium, no firm
starts the trial and both produce the collusive outcome. The profits are
the following:
ΠacE =
C
1− δE (7)
ΠacI =
C
1− δI − x(β) (8)
where C is the per-firm one-shot profit in case of collusion and the
apex ac denotes the collusive case.
In our framework collusion can emerge as equilibrium in two different
cases.
The first case occurs when firms are sufficiently patient to collude
even though no patent protection is implemented at stage t=0. Accord-
ing to Friedman (1971), this happens when:
δI ≥σI(β = 0) = D − C
D −N (9)
δE ≥σE(β = 0) = D − C
D −N (10)
where D is the one-shot deviation profit and σI(β = 0) and σE(β =
0) are the incumbent’s and the entrant’s critical discount factors when
β = 0.22 Hereafter we denote by σI(0) and σE(0) the critical discount
factors when β = 0 and by σI(β) and σE(β) the critical discount factors
when β > 0.
The second case occurs when condition (9) or (10) (or both) is not
satisfied at β = 0 and the incumbent implements a positive level of
patent protection (i.e. β > 0).
In this case firms play the following modified grim trigger strategy :
- when the new competitor enters the market no firm goes to court
and they collude in the first production stage;
- in the following repetitions any firm observes the behavior of the
competitor in the previous stage. If both firms played collusively, each
22Notice that, in β = 0, σI = σE =
D−C
D−N .
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firm continues to collude; if a deviation occurred, Nash reversion is im-
plemented as punishment. Furthermore, each firm sues the rival.
This collusive equilibrium requires that no firm goes to court and
no firm has a positive unilateral incentive to deviate from the collusive
production outcome.
Consider first the entrant’s incentive to deviate from collusion: she
may deviate from collusion either at t=2 or at t=3. When the entrant
deviates at t=2, she sues the incumbent and her expected profit, ΠncE , is
the one described in equation (3). When the entrant deviates at t=3 in
the production stage, she cheats the incumbent and goes to the court,
her expected profit, ΠdevE , is the following:
ΠdevE = (D − L) + β(−F ) + (1− β)
(
N
(
δE
1− δE
))
(11)
where the apex dev identifies the deviation case.23
In order to boost the entrant to collude, three constraints must be
fulfilled: one participation constraint, ΠacE ≥ 0, and two incentive com-
patible constraints, ΠacE ≥ ΠncE and ΠacE ≥ ΠdevE . It is trivial to show
that, for any β > 0, ΠncE < Π
dev
E ,and the second incentive compatible
constraints dominates the first one. Hence, the entrant’s incentive com-
patible constraint making collusion sustainable is the following:
C
1− δE ≥ (D − L) + β(−F ) +
(
δE
(
N(1− β)
1− δE
))
(12)
From which we obtain:
δE ≥ σE(β) = (D − L)− Fβ − C
(D − L)−N + β (N − F ) (13)
There is a threshold value of the entrant’s discount factor, σE(β),
making the constrain (12) satisfied as an equality. Consequently, the
collusive strategy is part of a SPNE only if the entrant’s discount factor,
δE, is not smaller than σE(β).
It is easy to check that increasing either the level of patent protec-
tion, the legal cost of a trial or the fine for violation (i.e. increasing
respectively β, L or F ), decreases the entrant’s critical discount factor,
σE(β), making collusion easier to sustain.
23As usual, we assume that D > C > N and L,F < N . Moreover, we set D such
that the for any β ∈ [0, 1], (D − L) − C + β(−F ) > 0; this avoids the trivial case
where collusion is sustainable for any δE ≥ 0.
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Consider now the incumbent’s incentive to deviate from collusion.
Deviating from collusion, the incumbent defects the tacit agreement
on production and sues the entrant for patent right infringement. This
is profitable only if the cost of a trial is smaller than the associated
expected benefit, i.e. if L ≤ β
(
F + δI
M−N
1−δI
)
.24
In such a case the profit of deviation is:
ΠDevI (β) = D + β
(
F + δI
M
1− δI
)
+ (1− β) δI
1− δIN − x(β)− L (14)
We set D such that, for any β ∈ [0, 1], (D − L)− C + β(F ) > 0.25
The incumbent’s incentive compatible constrain, ΠCollI (β) ≥ ΠDevI (β),
is now:
C
1− δI ≥ D − L+ β
(
F + δI
M
1− δI
)
+ (1− β)
(
δI
1− δIN
)
(15)
From which we obtain:
δI > σI(β) =
(D − L)− C + Fβ
(D − L)−N − β (M −N − F ) (16)
Also in this case, there is a threshold value of the incumbent’s dis-
count factor (σI(β)) making the constrain (15) satisfied as an equality.
Consequently, the collusive strategy is part of a SPNE only if the en-
trant’s discount factor, δI , is not smaller than σI(β).
Notice that, increasing either the level of patent protection (β) or
the fine (F ) increases the incumbent’s critical discount factor (σI(β)),
making collusion harder to sustain. Conversely, increasing the legal cost
of a trial (L) decreases the incumbent’s critical discount factor making
collusion easier to sustain.
For simplicity of notation, hereafter we use σ (0) and σ (0+) instead
of σE (0) = σI (0) and σE (0
+) = σI (0
+). Figure 2 represents the in-
cumbent’s and the entrant’s critical discount factors as functions of the
24Notice that when L > β
(
F + δI
M−N
1−δI
)
, the incumbent does not sue the com-
petitor and her expected profit by deviation becomes D+δI
N
1−δI as in the case where
β = 0.
25Analogously to the entrant’s case, this assumption avoids the trivial case where
collusion is sustainable for any δI ≥ 0.
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level of patent protection β enforced by the incumbent. The horizontal
dotted line represents the critical discount factor when β = 0 (no patent
protection): in this case, the incumbent’s and the entrant’s critical dis-
count factors are equal. In β = 0+, we observe the same downward
jump for both the critical discount factors; after that, when β > 0, the
decreasing continuous line represents σE(β) and the increasing dotted
line describes σI(β).
Figure 2: The critical discount factors
The analysis of Figure 2 allows us to state the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 Denoting by β the positive level of patent protection such
that σI(β) = σ(0), we have that:
- If β ≤ β, then σE(β) ≤ σ(0) and σI(β) ≤ σ(0);
- If β > β, then σE(β) ≤ σ(0) but σI(β) > σ(0).
Proof. When β = 0, a marginal increase in β has a negative and
discrete impact equal to L on the expected deviation gains of both the
firms. This creates a discontinuity and a downward jump in the discount
factors. Any additional increase in the level of patent protection has a
different impact on the entrant’s and the incumbent’s deviation profits,
and hence on the critical discount factors: the entrant’s critical discount
factor is decreasing, since increasing β raises the expected fine to be paid
reducing her deviation profits. For the incumbent we have the reverse:
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her critical discount factor is increasing, since increasing β raises the
expected fine to be received. Until the threshold values β, increasing
β implements levels of critical discount factors smaller than the ones
computed in the case of no patent protection. According to Figure 2,
for levels of β higher than β, σE(β) continues to decrease, while σI(β)
is higher than σ(0).
From the previous Proposition we obtain the following result:
Result 1 If β < β, increasing patent protection facilitates collusion;
if β ≥ β, increasing patent protection facilitates collusion only if the
incumbent is sufficiently patient
If β < β, both critical discount factors are smaller than the ones in the
no patent protection case (β = 0), hence collusion is easier. If β ≥ β,
the critical discount factor of the entrant continues to be smaller while
the incumbent’s one is higher than the ones obtained for β = 0, hence
a patient incumbent (a firm with a very high δi) may increase patent
protection in order to induce an impatient entrant to collude.
In both cases the level of patent protection is a strategic tool in the
hands of the incumbent, affecting collusion sustainability.
3.5 Collusion sustainability
In this class of models, the incumbent and the entrant have an individual
discount factor (respectively δI and δE) measuring their intertemporal
preferences: a firm with high level of δi is a patient firm, placing greater
weight on future profits. In the previous sections we computed the crit-
ical discount factors, σI (β) and σE (β) as a function of the level of β
implemented by the incumbent. In Figure 2, we drawn the critical dis-
count factors of the incumbent and the entrant as function of β.
Analyzing the graph we can obtain the necessary conditions for col-
lusion sustainability:
Proposition 2 If β˜i is the value of β such that σi(β) = δi (where
i = I, E), necessary conditions for collusion sustainability in the ac-
commodating subgame are:
(a) δI ≥ σ (0+);
(b) β˜I ≥ β˜E only if δE < σ (0+) .
Proof. (a) Collusion is sustainable if and only if, for each firm, the
individual discount factor is not smaller than her critical one. Since
σI (β) is increasing in β and σ (0
+), is the minimum value of the function
σI (β), if δI < σ (0
+), collusion cannot be sustainable by definition, hence
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we must have δI ≥ σ (0+) . (b) Compare now the two firms discount
factors, δI and δE. We have two possible cases. In the first case the
incumbent is the less patient, i.e. δE > δI : if δI < σ(0
+) collusion cannot
be sustainable; if δI ≥ σ(0), we have two patient firms and collusion is
sustainable at β = 0; if σ(0+) ≤ δI < σ(0) collusion is sustainable at
β = 0+. In the second case the entrant is the less patient, i.e. δI ≥ δE.
Analogously to the previous case, if δE ≥ σ(0), we have two patient
firms and collusion may be sustainable at β = 0; if σ(0+) ≤ δE < σ(0)
collusion may be sustainable at β = 0+. x Finally, if β˜I ≥ β˜E collusion
is sustainable when β = β˜E.
Figure 3 illustrates the relevant case where δE < σ(0
+) and δI >
σ(0+): in this case collusion is sustainable with β > 0.
Figure 3: The case where collusion is sustainable with β > 0
Considering the complete game, we obtain the following result:
Result 2 The collusive equilibrium is sustainable if and only if:
(a) the incumbent implements levels of patent protection equal to:
1. βac = 0 when δE ≥ σ (0) and δI ≥ σ (0)
2. βac = 0+ when δE ≥ σ (0+), δI ≥ σ (0+) and min [δE, δI ] < σ (0)
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3. βac = β˜E when δE < σ (0
+) , δI ≥ σ (0+) and β˜I ≥ β˜E
(b) collusion maximizes the incumbent’s expected profit, i.e. ΠacI (β
ac
I ) ≥
MAX
[
ΠncI (β
nc) ,ΠfdI
(
βfd
)
, 0
]
.
The previous result shows the amount of patent protection the incum-
bent may set to facilitate collusion with the entrant. This amount may
tend to zero; nevertheless, some cases exist where the equilibrium of the
game is given by β > 0.
When both firms are very patient (i.e. δE, δi ≥ σ (0)), collusion is
sustainable even though the incumbent does not invest in patent protec-
tion. Since implementing patent protection is costly, the optimal level
of patent protection is βac = 0.
When both firms are moderately patient (i.e. their discount factors
are not smaller than σ (0+) and at least one of the two is smaller than
σ (0)), implementing an infinitesimal level of patent protection βac =
0+ makes collusion sustainable. Such a level is sufficient to give the
incumbent the possibility of suing the entrant in case of deviation: both
firms bears the lawsuit cost L reducing their critical discount factors to
σ (0+) < σ (0).
When the incumbent is at least moderately patient but the entrant
is not (i.e. δE ≥ σ (0+) and δI < σ (0+)), the optimal level of patent
protection is βac = β˜E. Starting from β = 0
+, increasing β reduces the
entrant’s discount factor while increases the incumbent’s one. At β =
β˜E, the entrant has not unilateral incentives to deviate from collusion
(i.e. σE
(
β˜E
)
= δE); if neither the incumbent has incentives to deviate
(i.e. if σI
(
β˜E
)
≤ δI) collusion is sustainable in equilibrium. The latter
condition is satisfied if and only if β˜I ≥ β˜E.
Under which conditions is the collusive profit the highest? The law-
suit cost (L) and the cost for enforcing patent protection (x(β)) affect
the equilibria of the game. It is easy to check that for lawsuit costs high
enough, full deterrence emerges as an equilibrium, since a low level of
patent protection is sufficient to reduce to zero the entrant’s expected
profits; in other words, the incumbent remains monopolist with a very
low investment in patents. On the contrary, when the lawsuits costs are
low enough, full deterrence requires a larger investment; this may not
be profitable, hence incumbent may prefer an alternative strategy. If
the cost for implementing β is low enough, the incumbent enlarges her
patent portfolio in order to increase the probability to win the trial; if
the cost for implementing β is high enough she sets the minimum size
of the patent portfolio to induce collusion.
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Summing up, the incumbent might find it optimal to collude with
the entrant when the lawsuit cost is low enough and the cost for imple-
menting patent protection is high enough.
The general framework presented in this paper can be extended to
any kind of oligopolistic interaction. Here we present a numerical simu-
lation corresponding to the case illustrated in Figure 3, where the pos-
itive level of patent protection implemented by the incumbent may be
interpreted as a signal of the willingness of a more patient incumbent
to induce a less patient entrant to collude. However, any hypothesis
on product differentiation (horizontal or vertical), cost asymmetry, ge-
ographical distance between markets and so on, just affects the level of
the one-shot profits (N,C,D, and M) but does not alter the constraints
characterizing the collusive equilibrium.26
We assume that the inverse market demand function is linear and
given by P (qI , qE) = a − b(qI + qE), with a > 0, b > 0 where P, qI and
qE are respectively the market price, the incumbent’s and the entrant’s
output levels, which compete a` la Cournot. The cost functions are re-
spectively CI(qI) = cqI and CE(qE) = cqE with c ≥ 0. In order to
simplify calculation, we set a = b = 1 and c = 0. In this case it easy
to show that one-shot profits of monopoly, Cournot-Nash, collusion and
deviation, are respectivelyM = 1/4 = 0.25, N = 1/9 = 0.11, C = 1/8 =
0.125 and D = 9/64 = 0.14. Moreover we set F = N, L = N/10 and
x(β) = β2 and we assume that the firms’ discount factors are respectively
equal to δI = 0.50 and δE = 0.20.
In this case without a system of patent protection collusion is not
sustainable: it is easy to check that σ (0) = 0.529421 > δI = 0.50 and
σ (0+) = 0.24528 > δE = 0.20. Furthermore, we have β˜I = 0.0375 >
β˜E = 0.0075.
According to our model the incumbent has three strategies: she can
foreclose the entry setting βfd = 0.5111, she can play non collusively
setting βnc = 0.1389 or she can accommodate and collude setting βac =
β˜E = 0.0075. It is easy to obtain that Π
ac
I = 0.24999 > Π
fd
I = 0.23876 >
ΠncI = 0.17274: collusion is sustainable and preferred with respect to the
alternative strategies.
4 Policy implications and conclusion
Economic literature has pointed out a number of structural elements that
may affect firms’ ability to collude when implicit price fixing agreement
should be self-enforcing: e.g., number of firms, capacity constraints, de-
mand fluctuations, multi-market contacts etc. Antitrust authorities may
26More cases and numerical simulations can be provided on request.
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use these elements to identify situations where closer investigations are
needed.
In this paper we have obtained some clear results. Building a patent
portfolio and threatening patent litigation may be an anticompetitive
non-pricing mechanism: a patient incumbent might induce an impatient
entrant to collude, avoiding aggressive entries. Furthermore, this strat-
egy maximizes the incumbent’s expected profits with respect to other
non-cooperative ones, e.g. foreclosing the market. Finally, if the incum-
bent does not sue the entrant despite owning a patent portfolio, she is
trying to collude.
In terms of competition policy and welfare impact evaluation, if it
is unquestionable that accommodating entry and colluding is an anti-
competitive behavior, we have not to ignore that such a conduct may be
caused by an imperfection in the patent awarding system. Farrell and
Shapiro (2008) state: ”Roughly 15,000 patents a month are issued by the
US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). By law, these are supposed to
cover only novel and nonobvious inventions, but an average application
gets only about 1520 hours of patent examiner time, and a substantial
proportion of the few patents later fully evaluated in court are held in-
valid.” In other words, the PTO tends to delegate decisions about the
validity of patents to the courts, creating uncertainty and contributing
to make the patent protection system imperfect.
The welfare implications of this imperfection could be different ac-
cording to the type of firms that we are considering. We can distinguish
two cases. The first is the one of an innovative firm: with stochastic
patent protection, her monopoly power is not guaranteed and the entry
of mimic firms may occur. In this context, a collusive conduct could
be the best reply of a firm, that should have become a monopolist, to
a non-market imperfection. Moreover, collusion guaranties higher ex-
pected R&D returns, stimulating investments. The second case is the
one of a non-innovative firm that patents without a clear innovation, un-
deservedly obtaining market power. In this case, the prospect of collu-
sion does not affect R&D investments and this conduct is unambiguously
detrimental to the welfare.
Therefore, in both cases, the solution would be to increase efficiency
of the patent granting system reducing the uncertainty associated to
patent validity: a perfect patent granting system would guarantee in-
novative firms, while a market without clear innovations would be open
to competition. This solution would increase the costs for the PTO
that, given its overload, often prefers to approve most of the patents,
delegating their validity to court judgments.
Summing up, our model suggests that patenting may be aimed at
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collusion. This result seems in contrast with the traditional economic
wisdom that considers patents as an anti-collusive instrument since, in
a Schumpeterian perspective (Schumpeter 1942), patents should grant
firms temporary monopoly; however, if this statement were true, we
should note that in industries characterized by relevant R&D expendi-
tures and huge patent portfolios (for example, the knowledge-base ones)
firms rarely collude. On the contrary, coherently with our theoretical
results, empirical evidence shows that competitors do enter in markets
covered by patents, and collusion often emerges between patenting firms.
For example, recent lawsuits for collusion have involved companies in
high competitive markets all over the world: in 2005 in the USA, the
Samsung pleaded guilty to conspiring with Infineon and Hynix Semi-
conductor, to fix the price of dynamic random access memory (DRAM);
in 2006, the government of France fined 13 perfume brands including
L’Ore´al, Chanel, LVMH’s Sephora and Hutchison Whampoa’s Marion-
naud for price collusion between 1997 and 2000; in 2008 in the USA,
LG Display Co., Chunghwa Picture Tubes and Sharp Corp., agreed to
plead guilty for conspiring to fix prices of liquid crystal display panels
(LCD); a similar fine was committed in Europe in 2010 to LG, Chimei
Innolux, AU Optronics, Chunghwa Picture Tubes Ltd., and HannStar
Display Corp.; in 2012, South Korea’s antitrust regulator has fined Sam-
sung Electronics and LG Electronics, for conspiring to fix the prices of
some appliances (washing machines, flat-panel TVs and laptop comput-
ers). Other accusations of collusion have involved some of the Silicon
Valley giants (Apple, Adobe, Google, Intel and more) regarding their
agreement of not to hire each other’s staff, in order to keep wages low.
These markets, from the TV LCD to the perfume one, have a trait in
common: there is a huge amount of patents covering and protecting the
innovations. Patenting firms collude and, even if sometimes they go to
the court, lawsuits often end with out-of-court settlements: usually, firms
play with incomplete (or asymmetric) information and the trial may
provide the chance to meet each other in ”smoke-filled rooms” facilitating
collusion. This can explain the reason why a small percentage of trials
ends with a verdict.
Starting from the idea of stochastic patent protection, further ex-
tensions of our analysis move towards stressing the trade-off between
incentives to invest in R&D and incentives to create and enlarge patent
portfolios.
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